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The economic model of crime presupposes that individuals evaluate the decision to commit a crime rationally. A 
more inclusive version of this model would include social capital as a factor influencing criminal activity. The 
amount of social capital that exists within a group can be used to explain criminal behavior, and an increase in the 
level of social capital can be a factor capable of preventing crime. This study tests the hypothesis that increasing the 
level of social capital reduces the risk of victimization against property. Results from variations of an IV-Probit 
model were used to evaluate data from Latin American Public Opinion Project surveys conducted in Brazil. These 
results suggest that a higher level of social capital among individuals increases the likelihood that they will cooperate 
for mutual benefit, such as combating crime. 
Keywords: Interpersonal trust; Social cohesion; Economy of crime. 
 
Resumo  
O papel do capital social no risco de vitimização contra a propriedade: evidências para o Brasil 
O modelo econômico do crime pressupõe que indivíduos racionalmente decidem participar de uma atividade 
criminosa. Uma versão mais ampla desse modelo também inclui o capital social como um dos fatores que afetam a 
entrada na atividade ilegal. Isso porque a quantidade de capital social existente em determinado grupo de indivíduos 
pode também ser utilizada para explicar o comportamento criminoso, uma vez que um aumento no nível de capital 
social é um fator capaz de prevenir a criminalidade. Este estudo testa a hipótese de que um maior nível de capital 
social reduz o risco de vitimização contra a propriedade. Variações de um modelo IV-Probit foram utilizados para 
verificar o fenômeno a partir de dados da Latin American Public Opinion Project realizada no Brasil. Os resultados 
sugerem que um maior nível de capital social entre indivíduos aumenta a probabilidade de cooperarem para um 
benefício mútuo, como o combate à criminalidade. 
Palavras-chave: Confiança interpessoal; Coesão social; Economia do crime. 
JEL C35, D01, K14. 
 
1 Introduction 
Crime implies costs related to the erosion of social well-being due to fear and 
insecurity, an increase in public and private security spending, and a reduction in the stock of 
human capital. In regard to this social problem, Brazil stands out. The country has the largest 
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absolute number of homicides in the world and the 12th highest homicide rate per 100,000 
inhabitants (World Health Organization – WHO, 2014). These dismal statistics are not 
improving: between 2000 and 2012, the global homicide rate decreased 16 percent while 
Brazil's rate increased 8.6 percent (WHO, 2014). 
Given the importance of crime on any society’s well-being, many studies have been 
developed by those involved in the multidisciplinary field of criminology. Becker's seminal 
work “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968) details the causes of criminal 
behavior from an economics perspective. According to the author, the decision to participate 
in criminal activity is based on the agent’s economic rationality while evaluating the benefits 
against the costs of the activity. The economic benefits of illegal activity are associated with 
its monetary return when compared to the return from licit activities. The costs, in turn, are 
associated with the probability of being arrested and the severity of the punishment. Social 
capital is also a factor influencing criminal activity, and merits inclusion in the discussion on 
criminal motivation, especially the cost of criminal behavior and as an implicit factor affecting 
the risk of victimization (Lederman; Loayza; Menendez, 2002). 
The concept of social capital has been applied in several fields of social sciences, such 
as economics, administration, and public policy (Quddus et al., 2000). Originally, the term was 
used when evaluating the importance of social relationships that instill in individuals the notion 
of collective responsibility (Jacobs, 1961). In a more modern definition proposed by Norris 
(1996), social capital represents “dense networks of norms and social trust which enable 
participants to cooperate in the pursuit of shared objectives.” Another explanation is provided 
by Putnam (1993), in which social capital is developed through social interaction in communal 
organizations, such as networks, thereby creating a set of norms and interpersonal trust to 
facilitate actions and cooperation for mutual benefit. 
Because it is a broad concept, the inclusion of social capital in an empirical analysis is 
performed through proxies. Akçomak and Weel (2012) argue that these proxies are related to 
the individual’s participation in social organizations, such as churches, unions, non-
governmental organizations or charities, and the level of trust people have in each other. 
Despite multiple definitions, the level of interpersonal trust is considered one of the most 
important dimensions of social capital (Fukuyama, 1999; Zak; Knack, 2001, Uslaner, 2002, 
Beugelsdijk, 2006, Blanco; Ruiz, 2013). 
In the economic literature, studies have highlighted the importance of social capital to 
increase investments and productive efficiency (Dearmon; Grier, 2009), to increase the 
accumulation of physical capital (Dearmon; Grier, 2011) and human capital (Papagapitos; 
Riley, 2009; Dearmon; Grier, 2011), and to reduce income inequality (Knack; Keefer, 1997; 
Zak; Knack, 2001; Knack; Zak, 2002; Bergh; Bjørnskov, 2014).  
Applying the social capital concept to the economic theory of crime and considering 
the criminal’s perspective, the level of social capital (i.e., the level of interpersonal trust) in any 
group should influence the decision to commit a crime because the criminal act eminently 
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involves a moral dilemma: to commit a socially reprehensible act or not. The higher the level 
of social capital in the criminal’s society, the greater the disappointment when the society’s 
members become aware that one member has committed a crime and the greater the chance 
that the criminal will suffer feelings of guilt associated with unethical behavior. In this way, a 
higher level of social capital within a society would increase costs inherent in a member’s 
commission of a crime. If the benefits from the criminal activity exceed not only the costs in 
terms of institutional punishment and lost wages, but also the costs arising from societal 
disapproval and ethical consternation, then the potential criminal’s moral threshold will have 
been crossed and the crime will be committed. 
From the perspective of the victim, Putnam (1993) and Dilulio (1996) point out that a 
higher level of social capital makes it more likely that a society’s members will cooperate for 
their mutual benefit and provide the efficacy of the collective. This could generate mechanisms 
of social control to fight crime, such as the hiring of private security guards and monitoring the 
neighborhood. Bursick and Grasmick (1993) also argue that societies with a higher level of 
social capital inhibit victimization because they are more likely to obtain public services, such 
as those offered by the police. 
According to Bursick and Grasmick (1993), social capital must be an important 
consideration when trying to lower crime rates. A practical example of this can be found in the 
Programa Desarollo, Seguridad y Paz (Desepaz), a public policy implemented in Cali, 
Colombia. Desepaz seeks to increase social capital by encouraging civic participation, 
strengthening public institutions, and taking action to reduce social conflict. Cuesta et al. 
(2007) found that the resulting increase in social capital reduced violence and crime in the city. 
A number of empirical studies have tested the relationship between social capital and 
crime. In the international literature, one can highlight studies by Akçomak and Weel (2012), 
Cuesta and Alda (2012), Blanco and Ruiz (2013) and Corbacho et al. (2014). In the Brazilian 
literature, the only empirical analysis that considers the connection between social capital and 
crime can be found in Peixoto et al. (2012). Their study used the same proxy employed in our 
study (interpersonal trust) to empirically control the effect of social capital on the risk of 
victimization in the city of São Paulo.  
Our study’s main objective is to expand the investigation of social capital’s effect on 
the risk of being victimized to the whole of Brazil. A proxy variable, degree of interpersonal 
trust, is used to represent the level of social capital that exists within a society. The hypothesis 
is that increased interpersonal trust reduces the risk of victimization in two ways: reducing the 
benefits from crime and increasing the costs of crime. 
This study is divided into five more sections. The empirical model’s theoretical 
framework is briefly presented in Section 2. The data source and a summary of applied 
econometric procedures are detailed in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 give preliminary analyzes 
and empirical results, respectively. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
This section contains a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings for this study’s 
empirical model. The theoretical models are designed to predict the influence of social capital 
on criminal behavior and the possibilities of victimization. From the criminal perspective, the 
basis for our empirical model is outlined in the theoretical model designed by Lederman, 
Loayza and Menendez (2002) dealing with the influence of social capital on a criminal's 
decision to practice an illegal activity. From the victim’s perspective, the basis for our empirical 
model is derived from the model designed by Cohen, Kluegel and Land (1981) 
Following Becker (1968), the theoretical model constructed by Lederman, Loayza and 
Menendez (2002) (LLM model) presupposes that individuals’ rationally decide to participate 
in illicit activity. An individual will decide to commit a crime if the activity’s benefits outweigh 
its costs. 
As an extrapolation of the LLM theoretical model, consider a society composed of 
three individuals (𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑧). The net benefit (𝑏𝑙)  of agent 𝑖 committing a crime against 𝑗  
depends on the crime’s payoff matrix (𝑙𝑗 −  𝑤𝑖 + 𝑢(∆𝑠𝑘𝑖
𝑒)). This, in turn, is affected by the 
opportunity cost of the crime, which is obtained by subtracting earnings from legal activities 
(𝑤) from the value gained from the criminal activity (𝑙). In addition, the model assumes that 
an expected change in the social capital of individual 𝑖 (∆𝑠𝑘𝑖
𝑒) affects the net benefit of 
criminal activity by changing the individual’s utility function (𝑢).  
Agent 𝑖 will commit the crime against 𝑗 if the net benefit (𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑗) is greater than the 
individual’s moral threshold (𝑀∗), that is, if 
𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑗 =  𝑙𝑗 −  𝑤𝑖 + 𝑢(∆𝑠𝑘𝑖
𝑒)  ≥  𝑀∗    (1) 
The wages from the legal activities of agent 𝑖 are a function of their capital stock (𝑘, 
which includes human capital) and their social capital (𝑠𝑘) given by 
 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤(𝑘𝑖, 𝑠𝑘𝑖)    (2) 
where 𝑠𝑘𝑖, described in Eq. 2, depends on the relations between individual 𝑖 and other members 
of society. 
In this simplified model, social capital depends on two factors. The first is the social 
distance (𝑑) between agent 𝑖 and agents 𝑗 and 𝑧. The other is the degree of trust between agents 
(𝑟): 
𝑠𝑘𝑖 =  𝑔𝑖𝑗(𝑑𝑖𝑗 , 𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝑔𝑖𝑧(𝑑𝑖𝑧, 𝑟𝑖𝑧)   (3) 
For simplicity, Eq. 3 is considered additive, such that total social capital is not greater than the 
sum of the parts. The distance between individuals (𝑑) depends on exogenous factors, such as 
communication costs (CC), which depend on geographic, cultural and technological factors, 
among others. 
 The value of the reward agent 𝑖 will receive for committing the crime against 𝑗 (𝑙𝑗) 
corresponds to a portion of the income of 𝑗, that is, 
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𝑙𝑗 =  𝛼𝑤𝑗 =  𝛼[𝑤(𝑘𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝑗)] ;  0 < 𝛼 < 1    (4) 
Substituting Eqs. 2 and 4 in Eq. 1 follows that 
𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼{𝑤[𝑘𝑗, 𝑔𝑗𝑖(𝑑𝑗𝑖 , 𝑟𝑗𝑖) + 𝑔𝑗𝑧(𝑑𝑗𝑧, 𝑟𝑗𝑧)]} 
−𝑤{𝑘𝑖, [𝑔𝑖𝑗(𝑑𝑖𝑗 , 𝑟𝑖𝑗)]} + 𝑢(∆𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑒 ) +  𝑢(∆𝑟𝑖𝑧
𝑒 )   (5) 
 It is also be assumed that capital stock (𝑘 ) and social distance (𝑑) are fixed. Again, by 
evaluating the case of individual 𝑖 committing a crime against 𝑗, changes in the confidence 
level of 𝑗 relative to 𝑖 would affect the net benefit of committing the crime. This can be seen in 
Eq. 6, where ∆𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑗 is the total derivative of 𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑗 from Eq. 5. It is assumed that 






 ∆𝑟𝑗𝑧 ) – (
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑟𝑖𝑗
 ∆𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑟𝑖𝑧








𝑒  (6)  
In this scenario we can also consider two different cases. The first relates to the increase 
in social capital of the society as a whole and the second to the increase in the social capital of 
the specific group containing potential criminal 𝑖 and potential victim 𝑗 (excluding agent 𝑧). 
Given that social distance is constant, the increase in social capital is equivalent to the 
increase in the degree of trust between individuals (𝑟). Thus, in the case of an increase in the 
social capital of the group as a whole 
∆𝑟𝑖𝑗 =  ∆𝑟𝑖𝑧 =  ∆𝑟𝑗𝑧 > 0    (6.1) 
When we replace values greater than zero for ∆𝑟𝑖𝑗 , ∆𝑟𝑖𝑧 and ∆𝑟𝑗𝑧 in Eq. 6 and knowing 
that 0 < 𝛼 < 1, we can verify that the result will be less than zero for ∆𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑗. In other words, 
the increase in the whole society’s social capital has a negative effect on the net benefit to the 
agent committing the crime. In the case of an increase in the social capital of the specific group 
containing potential criminal 𝑖 and the potential victim 𝑗  
∆𝑟𝑖𝑗 > 0; ∆𝑟𝑖𝑧 =  ∆𝑟𝑗𝑧 = 0    (6.2) 
By replacing ∆𝑟𝑖𝑗 > 0 and ∆𝑟𝑖𝑧 =  ∆𝑟𝑗𝑧 = 0 in Eq. 6 and with  0 < 𝛼 < 1, the result 
will also be less than zero for ∆𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑗. Through application of the LLM model, it is expected that 
higher levels of trust both across society and between groups have a negative effect on the net 
benefit of committing the crime. 
Social capital also affects victim behavior. Madalozzo and Furtado (2011) point out 
that analyzing the relationship between social capital and victim behavior is complex, since 
there is no consolidating theory capable of substantiating the behavior of the victim to provide 
a basis for empirical analysis. A theory that offers a basis for empirical analysis of the 
relationship between social capital and victim behavior was proposed by Cohen, Kluegel and 
Land (1981) which composes what are known as life-style theoretical models, which are 
referred to in this paper as the CKL model1. According to CKL theory, the risk of victimization 
is determined by five main factors: exposure, proximity, capacity to secure protection, victim 
attractiveness, and the nature of the crime. Exposure relates to the potential victim’s visibility 
                                                                
(1) For more victimization theories, see Seigel (2006). 
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and the visibility of that individual’s material goods at any time and place. Proximity, in turn, 
concerns the individual's distance from areas where violent behavior is more prevalent and that 
are historically characterized by criminal activities. The capacity to secure protection depends 
on the effectiveness of actions taken by potential victims to protect themselves from criminal 
activities (hiring security, installing cameras and safety equipment). A potential victim’s 
attractiveness refers to the apparent physical ability of the victim to resist criminal attack. 
Finally, the nature of the crime is defined by the type of crime to be committed by the potential 
offender, which influences the victim’s level of risk. 
As stressed by Justus and Kassouf (2013), the theory proposed by Cohen, Kluegel and 
Land (1981) is very broad, and it is difficult to precisely define or determine the influence of 
theory’s variables; however, it is not hard to accept the notion that social capital affects the 
variables’ influences. For example, if the individual feels secure and confident in their 
community, they will be more likely to explore the neighborhood and use and display items of 
value. Being rational, a potential victim that feels secure would be expected to have higher 





The majority of this study’s data sources are Latin American Public Opinion Project - 
LAPOP surveys conducted by Vanderbilt University. Data for the variables inequality and 
homicide were obtained from data compiled by Ipeadata. The Lapop surveys have been 
conducted bi-annually since 2004 in 26 Latin American, Central and North America countries. 
The first of these surveys carried out in Brazil was in 2006, and the last edition of Brazilian 
survey results was published in 2014. The main objective of the research is to collect public 
opinion on issues involving politics, economics, democracy, and civil participation. The survey 
uses a representative sample of the adult population of eligible voters who are generally over 
16 years of age. Only individuals living in “normal” society are able to participate, which 
excludes people living in boarding schools, hospitals, police academies, military barracks and 
prisons. The observation unit is the individual, preferably a reference person in the household 
being interviewed. The sampling method involves stratification determined by the size of 
municipalities, urban and rural areas, and regions. 
For most variables, our study uses Lapop data from surveys conducted in 2010, 2012 
and 2014. These data were then organized into sets of pooled data. The surveys from 2006 and 
2008 were not used because the data from those surveys were not separated into categories that 
distinguished victimization of property from victimization of persons.  
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
Table 1 names the variables used in the study’s empirical victimization model, 
provides a definition of each variable, and gives a summary of statistics linked with each 
variable. 
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Table 1 
The variables used in all variants of the empirical criminal victimization model, their definitions, and their 
calculated means, standard deviations (s.d.) and expected signals (e.s.). 
Definition Mean s.d. e.s. 
Victim 
1 if the individual was victimized(1) in the 12 months before the 
research, and 0 otherwise. 
0.17 0.37  
Social 
capital 
1 if the individual considers people who live in their community very 
trustworthy or somewhat trustworthy, and 0 not very trustworthy and 
untrustworthy 
0.58 0.49 – 
Work 1 if the individual works or studies, and 0 otherwise 0.72 0.44 + 
Man 1 if the individual is a man, and 0 otherwise 0.50 0.50 – 
Urban 1 if the individual lives in an urban area, and 0 otherwise 0.86 0.34 + 
Classpop 
1 if the individual lives in a city with less than 25 thousand 
inhabitants 
0.08 0.26 – 
2 if the individual lives in a city with between 25 and 50 thousand 
inhabitants 
0.24 0.43 – 
3 if the individual lives in a city with between 50 and 200 thousand 
inhabitants 
0.22 0.41 – 
4 if the individual lives in a city with between 200 and 500 thousand 
inhabitants 
0.20 0.40 – 
5 if the individual lives in a city with more than 500 thousand 
inhabitants 
0.26 0.44 Base 
Age 
1 if the individual is 16-25 years old  0.23 0.42 + 
2 if the individual is 26-35 years old  0.25 0.43 + 
3 if the individual is 36-45 years old  0.21 0.40 + 
4 if the individual is over 46 years old 0.31 0.46 Base 
Schooling Years of schooling 8.40 3.90 – 
Income 
Class A – 1 if the monthly per capita income is greater than R$ 
1,041.00, and 0 otherwise 
0.28 0.45 Base 
Class B – 1 if the monthly per capita income is between R$ 411,00 
and R$ 1.040,00, and 0 otherwise 
0.26 0.43 ? 
Class C – 1 if the monthly per capita income is smaller than R$ 
410,00, and 0 otherwise 
0.46 0.49 ? 
Inequality 
Population ratio of income held by the richest 20% compared to the 
poorest 20% of each Federation Unit 
0.55 0.13 + 
Homicide Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants for the Federation Unit 26.9 12.8 + 
Gangs 
The individual’s perception regarding the presence of gangs in the 
neighborhood: 
   
1 if not at all affected 0.29 0.45 Base 
2 if slightly affected 0.36 0.48 – 
3 if reasonably affected 0.16 0.37 – 
4 if greatly affected 0.19 0.39 – 
Year Year dummies    
State Federation Unit dummies    
Note: (1) Unarmed robbery with and without physical threat; armed robbery; burglary of home and extortion. Data 
obtained from the LAPOP survey databases (2010, 2012 and 2014). The variables inequality and homicide were 
obtained from data compiled by Ipeadata for the same years as the Lapop data employed. 
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 The dependent variable victim has a binary characteristic; therefore, a probit model 
based on Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.470) is defined as 
𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 =   𝛽
′𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃
′𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡    (7) 
where  𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 assumes a value of 1 if individual 𝑖 has suffered a crime against property in 
the twelve months of survey year 𝑡, and 0 otherwise; 𝛾𝑖𝑡 is the vector of characteristics that 
influence the risk of victimization; 𝑖𝑡 is the random error term normally distributed, and 𝜃 and 
𝛽 are parameters to be estimated. 
 The explanatory variable of interest, 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡, was constructed from answers 
to the following question from the survey: 
And speaking of the people from around your community, would you say that people in 
your community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or 
untrustworthy...?2  
The answer to this question was categorical, assuming value 1, if the individual 
answered “Very trustworthy”; 2, if “Somewhat trustworthy”; 3, if “Not very trustworthy”; and 
4, if “untrustworthy  
To facilitate the interpretation of the social capital variable, the categories were 
aggregated into pairs so that 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡  assumes value 0 if individual i  in year 𝑡  
answered “not very trustworthy” or “untrustworthy” and 1 if the response was “very 
trustworthy” or “somewhat trustworthy.” 
It is noteworthy that it is expected that 𝛽 < 0 (i.e., that social capital reduces the risk 
of victimization). This is the hypothesis tested in this study. 
The victimization risk conditional on the values of the explanatory variables contained 
in 𝛾𝑖 is given by the following equation: 
Pr(𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚 = 1) =  𝐹(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡; 𝛾𝑖𝑡)    (8) 
where F is a cumulative normal distribution function described by 
𝐹(𝑧) = ∫ 𝛿(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝑧
−∞
    (9) 










′ 𝜃)𝜃𝑡    (10) 




                                                                
(2) Community refers to the neighborhood in which the individual interviewed lives. 
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In order to avoid bias caused by the presence of unobservable characteristics by the 
model, the error term will be estimated by neighborhood clusters. Application of the cluster 
allows observations from individuals belonging to the same neighborhood to be treated as 
dependents, making it possible to control unobservable variations within each neighborhood 
and biases caused by omitted variables. This involves, for example, controlling neighborhood 
characteristics related to income and social inequality, presence of policing, and probability of 
punishment, which tend to be the same for individuals living in the same neighborhood3. 
The selection of explanatory variables (Table 1) was conditioned by the LLM and CKL 
models presented in the previous section and, above all, in previous empirical studies, more 
specifically those conducted by Scorzafave et al. (2011), Gomes and Paz, (2008), Madalozzo 
and Furtado (2011), Justus and Kassouf (2013). 
The works variable represents a proxy for the exposure to public spaces. If the 
individual works or studies outside the home, a positive relationship with the risk of 
victimization is expected. This effect was observed empirically by Justus & Kassouf (2013). 
The variable man represents the gender of the individual interviewed. Women are 
expected to be more likely to be victimized, since, according to the CKL theory, the apparent 
physical ability of the victim to resist a criminal attack influences the risk of victimization. 
Demographic characteristics were controlled by the urban and classpop variables. The 
urban variable indicates if the individual resides in an urban or rural environment. This 
inclusion is motivated by the fact that the distinct dynamicity in urban areas implies a greater 
occurrence of crime (Wisheit et al., 1994; Muhammad, 2002); although, crime is growing at 
higher rates in rural rather than urban areas (Rand; Catalano, 2007, Scorzafave et al., 2015, 
Justus et al., 2016). The classpop variable indicates the number of inhabitants in the 
interviewee’s city and is separated into four sub-groups. A positive relationship is expected 
between this variable and the risk of victimization given that greater population density 
increases the risk of the individual living within a potentially violent area. Both the urban and 
classpop variables capture the distance between individuals (𝑑) as determined by the LLM 
model and specified in Eq. 3 of Section 2. 
It is also expected that the age variable, subdivided into four sub-groups, is negatively 
correlated with risk of victimization, since younger individuals are more exposed to the risk of 
victimization than older individuals (Cuesta; Alda, 2012; Justus; Kassouf, 2013; Scorzafave et 
al., 2015). 
With regard to the schooling and income variables, it is expected that the more educated 
and higher income individuals in Brazil will appear to be higher value targets when exposed in 
many public spaces. However, individuals with higher incomes also have more financial 
resources that can be directed toward insuring their own security, which would imply a 
                                                                
(3) For an explanation about clustering effects on the estimates, see Cameron and Miller (2015). 
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reduction in the risk of victimization (Justus; Kassouf, 2013). Thus, the effect of the income 
variable cannot be anticipated. 
Three environmental factors capable of influencing the victimization risk were added 
to the model. The first, the inequality variable, indicated the proportion of income held by the 
richest 20 percent in relation to the poorest 20 percent in a specific geographic area. The 
geographic areas were Federation Units (states and the Federal District) as opposed to 
municipalities or neighborhoods because information for these smaller areas was not provided 
in all the surveys. The expected result is that the greater the proportion of the geographic area’s 
total wealth held by the wealthiest 20 percent relative to the poorest 20 percent, the greater the 
risk of victimization. Although observed with other inequality proxies, this relationship was 
also found in other studies, notably those by Araujo and Fajnzylber (2001); Mendonça et al. 
(2003) and Scorzafave and Soares (2009). 
The homicide variable was included because it was expected that the greater the 
number of homicides per capita in an area, the greater the risk of victimization since the area’s 
residents would be exposed to more violence that those living in areas with fewer homicides 
per capita. The variable is defined by the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in a Federation 
Unit and the expected relationship is positive. The gangs variable represents an individual’s 
perception of the influence of gangs in the individual’s neighborhood and was added to 
complement the scope of the homicide variable. The expected relationship is positive since this 
type of organization uses, for the most part, violence for the resolution of conflicts (McCarthy, 
2013). 
Year and state dummies variables were also included in the empirical model to control 
the effects of time and for the heterogeneity among Federation Units, both of which could 
influence the risk of victimization. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the variable of interest in this study, social capital, 
is potentially endogenous due to the possible simultaneity between this proxy variable and the 
risk of victimization. Therefore, we included two instrumental variables in the models, politics 
and news. The identification strategy is presented below. 
When estimating the relation between risk of victimization and level of social capital 
there is a potential problem with endogeneity. This is because the relationship between social 
capital and crime reduction is not a one-way relationship; it is also possible to analyze the effect 
of crime on social capital. 
Cuesta and Alda (2012) note that criminologists and sociologists have developed 
theories emphasizing that “victims trust less than non-victims;” in this way crime has reduced 
social capital. Among the scarce literature that seeks to analyze this relationship, we highlight 
Blanco’s study (2013) of Mexico. Blanco (2013) employed an ordered logit model with fixed 
effects and found that insecurity and crime reduce confidence in democracy and institutions. 
There are also studies by Blanco and Ruiz (2013) corroborating this result for Colombia and 
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by Corbacho et al. (2014) that addresses the problem in Latin American countries by applying 
propensity score matching methodology. The main conclusion from these three studies is that 
crime negatively affects social capital. 
Given the possibility of two-way causality between the variables of interest in our 
study, one or more instrumental variables with exogenous variation were added in a Two-Stage 
Least Squares estimation (TSLS). For details, see Greene (2012, pp. 259-273). 
In the context of a binary result model, an IV-Probit model is fitted, which in the first 
stage consists of estimating the equation 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜋0 +  ∑ 𝜋1𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜋2𝑍
𝑘
𝑡=1 + 𝜗𝑖    (11) 
to obtain estimates for the potentially endogenous variable (𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡) as a function of 
the explanatory variables in Eq. 7 with the addition of Z instruments. It is assumed that the 
instruments are not correlated with the Eq. 7 error term; however, they are correlated with the 
endogenous regressor. The random error term 𝜗𝑖 is independent and identically distributed. 
The predicted values of social capital in the reduced form of Eq. 11 replace the original variable 
contained in the model expressed in Eq. 7. After this substitution, Eq. 7 is estimated by 
maximum likelihood. The instruments should have two attributes: i) explanatory power over 
the endogenous variable; and ii) not be correlated with the dependent variable and, 
consequently, with the equation’s error term. In our specific case, the instruments must have a 
relation with social capital, but not correlate with the dependent variable victim. 
In order to meet these requirements, two variables were selected from the database and 
labeled “politics” and “news”. Their validity as instruments was evaluated using the Hausman 
(1978) and Sargan (1958) tests. 
The politics variable is a proxy representing an individual’s degree of political 
engagement. Wollebaek and Selle (2003) consider this variable to be multidimensional and 
that it reflects on an individual’s participation in protests, participation and interest in politics 
and political groups, and other related variables. In this study, we assign a value to the politics 
variable that is determined by the LAPOP survey respondent’s answer to the question 
How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? 
The argument that the instrumental variable politics has explanatory power for a 
correlation between social capital and politics, thereby satisfying attribute i), is based on 
Putnam‘s (1995, p. 665-666) notion that social capital (social trust) is strongly correlated with 
political engagement in that interest in politics affects an individual’s level of trust in political 
institutions. The relationship between social capital and political engagement tends to be 
negative (Wollebaek; Selle 2002, p. 39). In order to comply with attribute ii), there is no reason 
to assume there is a relationship between the degree of interest in politics and the risk of 
victimization. 
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The inclusion of the second instrumental variable, news, allows one to determine if the 
instruments are valid using an overidentification test, which can only be conducted when two 
or more variables are used as instruments for an endogenous regressor. In the study’s model, 
this variable indicates the frequency that the individual reads or listens to news, and the data 
that determines this variable’s value come from answers to the Lapop survey question, 
About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers 
or the internet? 
It is expected that the frequency that the individual is exposed to news influences the 
individual’s level of trust, satisfying attribute i), but the frequency that the individual is exposed 
to news does not influence the victimization risk, satisfying attribute ii). Therefore, as in the 
case of the first instrument, news is a variable with exogenous variation to victimization. 
 
4 Preliminary analysis 
Nearly 19 percent of individuals sampled in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 surveys (849 
individuals) had suffered some crime against property in the 12 months prior to the interview. 
Table 2 shows the nature of the crime per year of the survey. The most frequently suffered 
crime against property was armed robbery (39.9%), followed by unarmed robbery with no 
physical threats (20.8%), then by home burglary (14.49%). Emphasis can be placed on the 
percentage of respondents that suffered from home burglaries between 2010 and 2014, 
declining from 18 percent in 2010 to 9.9 percent in 2014. Unfortunately, the frequency of 




Type of crime suffered per year of survey 
Type of crime you have suffered in the last 
 12 months 
Year   
2010 2012 2014 Total 
n % n % n % n % 
Armed robbery 160 40.0 98 43.4 81 36.3 339 39.9 
Unarmed robbery, no physical threats 84 21.0 41 18.1 52 23.3 177 20.8 
Burglary of your home 72 18.0 29 12.8 22 9.9 123 14.5 
Unarmed robbery with physical threats 30 7.5 14 6.2 29 13.0 73 8.6 
Extorsion 17 4.2 13 5.7 13 5.8 43 5.0 
Other 37 9.3 31 13.7 26 5.8 94 5.0 
Total 400 100 226 100 223 100 849 100 
 Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
Table 3 presents the joint frequency of the surveyed individuals’ responses to questions 
regarding level of interpersonal trust and victimization.  
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It is observed that in the sample only 20.4 percent of the surveyed Brazilians, both non-
victims and victims, consider people very trustworthy, 70.7 percent consider people to be 
somewhat trustworthy or not very trustworthy, and 8.8 percent consider people to be 
untrustworthy. It can be seen that victims have a low level of trust relative to non-victims, 15.8 
percent vs. 21.2 percent, respectively, corroborating the not too shocking hypothesis that 
victims trust others less than non-victims (Cuesta; Alda, 2012). 
 
Table 3 
Interpersonal confidence levels for victims and non-victims of crime 
Have you been a 
victim of any type 
of crime in the 
past 12 months? 







n % n % n % n % n % 
No 939 21.2 1.704 38.5 1.418 32.0 366 8.3 4.427 100 
Yes 132 15.8 287 34.3 318 38.0 99 11.8 836 100 
Total 1,071 20.4 1,991 37.8 1,736 33.0 465 8.8 5,263 100 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
Table 4 shows the average values for the victims’ and non-victims’ characteristics. 
Corroborating results shown in Table 3, the first conclusion is that non-victims have a higher 
level of interpersonal confidence than victims. In addition, the characteristics that stood out 
most within the victims’ group were the values for males, living in urban areas, between 16 
and 25 years of age, having a higher educational level, living where there are gangs, and living 
in Federal Units with higher homicide rates. 
The last column of Table 4 reports the results of the t-test of equality of means and the 
z-test of proportions (for the cases of subdivided variables) between the two groups that 
compose the sample: victims and non-victims. 
 
Table 4 
Unpaired t and z tests between victimized and non-victimized individuals 
 Non-victimized Victmized z/t test 
Social capital 
0.59 0.48 0.11*** 
(0.49) (0.50) (0.02) 
Work 
0.71 0.8 -0.08*** 
(0.45) (0.40) (0.02) 
Man 
0.49 0.53 -0.03* 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02) 
Urban 
0.85 0.93 -0.08*** 
(0.36) (0.25) (0.01) 
Classpop (< 25 thousand 
inhab.) 
0.25 0.34 -0.09*** 
(0.43) (0.47) (0.02) 
to be continue... 
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Table 4 – Continuation  
 Non-victimized Victmized z/t test 
Classpop ( ≥25k to < 50k) 
0.20 0.24 -0.05*** 
(0.40) (0.43) (0.02) 
Classpop ( ≥50k to  <200k) 
0.22 0.21 0.01 
(0.42) (0.41) (0.02) 
Classpop (≥200k to <500) 
0.25 0.15 0.09*** 
(0.43) (0.36) (0.02) 
Classpop (≥ 500 thousand 
inhab.) 
0.08 0.05 0.02*** 
(0.28) (0.23) (0.01) 
Age (16-25) 
0.23 0.27 -0.04*** 
(0.42) (0.44) (0.02) 
Age (26-35) 
0.25 0.26 -0.01 
(0.43) (0.44) (0.02) 
Age (36-45) 
0.20 0.25 -0.04*** 
(0.40) (0.43) (0.02) 
Age (46+) 
0.32 0.22 0.10*** 
(0.47) (0.41) (0.02) 
Schooling 
8.25 9.26 -1.07*** 
(3.91) (3.75) (0.15) 
Income (class A) 
0.29 0.29 -0.00 
(0.45) (0.45) (0.02) 
incOme (class B) 
0.25 0.26 -0.00 
(0.44) (0.44) (0.02) 
Income (class C) 
0.46 0.45 0.01 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02) 
Inequality 
0.55 0.55 0.00 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.01) 
Homicide 
26.71 27.81 -0.97** 
(12.61) (12.88) (0.48) 
Gangs (nothing affected) 
0.16 0.31 -0.15*** 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gangs (slightly affected) 
0.16 0.18 -0.02* 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Gangs (reasonably affected) 
0.36 0.31 0.04** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Gangs (greatly affected) 
0.30 0.18 0.12*** 
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01) 
Source: Prepared by the authors. Note: standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
5 Results 
 Table 5 shows the results from the three variations of the probit empirical model: the 
basic model without instrumental variables (Model 3) and two variations that include 
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instrumental variables (IV-Probit 1 & 2). Model I includes only the instrumental variable 
politics. Model II includes both politics and news, the other instrumental variable. The 
inclusion of the second instrument allows the application of an overidentification test. Model 
III does not include the instrumental variables, that is, without correction for potential 
endogeneity. Results from this model are shown in the last column of Table 3. 
For Model I, the Wald test result indicates that the exogeneity hypothesis should be 
rejected. Therefore, endogeneity must be treated with the use of instrumental variables. With 
the inclusion of the politics variable as an instrument (Model I), the Hausman test indicated 
that the estimates are consistent 
Model II includes instrumental variables politics and news. For Model II, the Sargan 
test indicated that the hypothesis of overidentification cannot be rejected (p-value 0.6958), 
implying orthogonality between the instruments and the error term. In other words, the Sargan 
test indicated that the instruments used are statistically valid. 
Another fact corroborating the instruments’ validity is that the variable politics was 
statistically significant in the first stage for Model I and both politics and news were significant 
for Model II, corroborating the fact that these instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
social capital regressor. 
Interpreting the results, it can be seen that regardless of which adjusted model is used, 
there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between social capital and 
victimization risk. It should be noted that the model without correction for endogeneity (Model 
III) also presents this negative association, however, in a magnitude lower than that estimated 
by models I and II, which leads to the conclusion that omission of the instrumental variables 
for the treatment of endogeneity leads to the underestimation of social capital’s effect on the 
risk of victimization. 
Our results corroborate findings from international studies that also empirically 
investigated the relationship between social capital and the risk of victimization. Akçomak & 
Weel (2012) found that social capital is able to explain about 10 percent of the changes in 
criminal rates in the Netherlands. Putnam (2001) found that the social capital ratio in the United 
States is negatively correlated with the county’s homicide rate. Takagi et al. (2012) found that 
social capital significantly reduces the risk of victimization in the city of Tokyo. The same 
result was found for the city of Cali, Colombia by Cuesta & Alda (2012). With a cross-country 
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Table 5 
Estimated coefficients in the first stage and marginal effects in the mean (M.E.) obtained in  




Model I (IV-Probit) Model II (IV-Probit) 
Model III 
(Probit) 
 First stage M.E. First stage M.E. M.E. 



























































































































































































































Dummies for year and state Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman (p-value) 0.9993   
Wald (p-value) 0.0359 0.0361  
Sargan (p-value)  0.6958  
N 4.905 4.875 4.936 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively; Estimated probability coefficients are available upon request. 
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The empirical results presented in Table 5 for the relationship between social capital 
and the risk of victimization align with those predicted in Section 2’s discussion of the 
theoretical model. For the LLM theoretical model, higher confidence levels imply a reduction 
in the net benefit of a criminal practice, that is, the moral threshold for committing a criminal 
act rises. In the CKL theoretical approach, higher confidence levels can be verified only in 
regions where the victimization risk is low. In addition, an increase in a particular society’s 
level of social capital would imply an increase in the likelihood that its citizens’ cooperate for 
their mutual benefit, such as by actively combating crime, thereby reducing their risk of 
victimization (Putnam, 1993; Dilulio, 1996). 
The level of social cohesiveness generated by interpersonal trust is a factor that affects 
the risk of victimization. It has been found that a sense of societal unity will positively influence 
a society’s motivation to report crimes to competent authorities, thereby, increasing the 
potential cost of committing a crime (Conklin, 1975; Black, 1976; Gottfredson; Hindelang, 
1979; Baumer 2002; Warner, 2007). These authors put forward the following hypothesis: if 
individuals living in the same neighborhood trust each other, they will report the crime to the 
police and will trust the police to both investigate the crime and not initiate reprisals for 
reporting the crime. If the crime is reported to trustworthy, competent authorities, the risk of 
victimization is reduced as the threat of police investigation will inhibit criminal activity. 
Independent of the analyzed model, data showed that there is a negative relation 
between risk of victimization and age. The risk is greater for individuals between 16 and 25 
years of age than for those aged 46 and over. This is unsurprising since younger individuals 
tend to be exposed in environments that have a higher risk of victimization. This age 
relationship was also verified in Madalozzo and Furtado (2011) for robbery, auto theft, and 
physical aggression. The same relationship between age and both robberies and home 
burglaries was found by Justus and Kassouf (2013). 
An estimated positive relation between the variables victim and work was established 
by all variations of our study’s model, suggesting that individuals who study and/or work are 
at greater risk of suffering a crime than those that do not. Assuming that most students and 
workers carry out these activities outside the home, this finding is most probably due to greater 
exposure to public spaces, such as more time spent traveling or eating outside the home. The 
result is in line with the CKL theory, which relates greater exposure with an increase in the risk 
of victimization. A study by Beato et al. (2004) also found the same relationship. 
Although we expected a positive relation between the risk of victimization and the 
variable man, results indicated that the relationship was not significant. However, this 
unexpected finding agreed with results from a study conducted by Justus and Kassouf (2013) 
using data from a sample of people living in the municipality of São Paulo. 
The fact that the individual resides in the urban environment appeared to be positively 
related to the risk of victimization. In the urban environment, there is a greater agglomeration 
of individuals belonging to different social classes, which leads to an extremely dynamic set of 
Gustavo Carvalho Moreira, Ana Lucia Kassouf, Marcelo Justus 
580  Economia e Sociedade, Campinas, v. 28, n. 2 (66), p. 563-585, maio-agosto 2019. 
economic and social relations that favors the occurrence of crime. This result is theoretically 
supported by the CKL theory. It should be noted that the urban variable together with the 
categorical classpop was used to control the distance between individuals (𝑑), as established 
in the LLM theoretical model and specified in Eq. 3. 
For the income variable, Gavíria and Pagés (2002) suggest that individuals’ incomes 
determine both their attractiveness to criminals and their ability to contract security services to 
protect their residences and themselves and minimize exposure in unsafe public spaces. The 
attributes of the wealthy, attractiveness and protected aloofness, have opposing effects on the 
rational criminal when considering the commission of an illegal act. On the one hand, the 
wealthy are more likely to attract the criminal’s eye but on the other, the wealthy are more 
likely to employ protective measures. The much less wealthy are less likely to attract criminals 
but do not have enough resources to acquire protective services or devices. In our study, income 
level showed a negative relation with the risk of victimization (the estimated coefficients of B 
and C income classes were higher than for those at the highest income level). 
Finally, the variable gangs, which acted as a proxy for a neighborhood’s intrinsic 
security characteristics, presented a negative estimated coefficient. In other words, the 
perception that there is the presence of gangs in a neighborhood reduces the risk of 
victimization. A priori, we expected the opposite: more gangs lead to greater victimization. 
Possibly, gangs protect the neighborhood and resolve civil conflicts, play the role of the 
competent authorities, and/or discourage appearances in public, thereby, reducing 
victimization. This hypothesis should be investigated in future studies. 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
Crime is a complex phenomenon, and the study of its causes requires a 
multidisciplinary analysis. Both the “supply” side of crime, that is, what influences the 
individual's decision to engage in illegal activity, as well as the “demand” side, or what 
conditions influence the possibility of victimization, must be investigated to understand the 
phenomenon of crime and victimization. 
In this study, we tested the hypothesis that social capital has a negative effect on the 
risk of victimization against property and, consequently, crime rates. We found this hypothesis 
to be valid. The causal effect of social capital on the risk of victimization travels through two 
main channels. 
The first channel is related to the fact that a higher level of social capital among 
individuals of the same community strengthens social connections, which encourages the 
adoption of mechanisms capable of generating mutual social benefit, such as the reciprocal 
protection among neighbors and the adoption of security devices common to neighborhoods. 
The second channel is related to the “supply” of crimes. In communities where social capital 
is high, that is, where people trust each other, it is to be expected that the moral threshold that 
must be crossed before the commission of a crime is higher; therefore, individuals are less 
The role of social capital in the victimization risk against property: evidence from Brazil 
581  Economia e Sociedade, Campinas, v. 28, n. 2 (66), p. 563-585, maio-agosto 2019. 
willing to commit crimes. This connection is supported by the theory of social disorganization, 
in which social aspects related to an individual's experience in the community influence the 
decision to commit crimes or take part in licit activities. 
We highlight that the results related to the variable of interest - social capital – were 
robust when the basic model was adjusted to control for endogeneity. We conclude that the 
treatment applied to control endogeneity was sufficient. We found that uncorrected estimates 
for endogeneity underestimated the effect of social capital on the risk of victimization. 
Since a higher level of social capital can reduce the risk of victimization, and 
consequently reduce the level of crime, public policies that increase social capital would be 
useful tools if reducing a country’s crime level is a priority. But increasing the level of social 
capital can be a complex and multi-factored endeavor since it entails raising the society’s level 
of trust in others and in institutions and in raising the population’s moral threshold. The state 
could and should take steps to increase social capital by actively promoting greater societal 
engagement, improving its image as an institution meriting confidence, showing that it is 
capable of securing its citizens’ personal security, and demonstrating that it is actively engaged 
in the struggle to improve their lives. 
The Programa Desarollo, Seguridad y Paz (Desepaz) implemented in Cali, Colombia, 
successfully raised the level of social capital within the city’s districts by many means, among 
them it promoted and held community meetings between concerned citizens and the city’s 
mayor regarding security issues. By the second year after the program’s inauguration, homicide 
levels within the city had begun to fall, and this was after years of increasing rates. Besides 
holding weekly meetings between government officials and city residents, the program 
initiated the construction of legal institutions in neighborhoods farthest from the central region, 
widely disseminated relevant civic information, fostered positive social interactions, and 
actively promoted harmonious coexistence through peaceful communication during times of 
stress rather than physical altercations, such as those brought about by “road rage” during the 
rush hour. The program’s successes indicate that by showing an interest it its residents’ security 
and actively promoting their interests, the government can work to increase social capital. 
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